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Learning From Social Sciences: A Model
For Reformation of the Laws Affecting
Stepfamilies
David R Fine*
Mark A. Fine**
I. Introduction
"In her dreary kitchen Cinderella had no thought of litigation,
nor of the august courts and legislatures which have toiled sporadically to define the incidents of her status."1 That was written in
1939. Cinderella is still waiting.2
Family law is essentially the province of the states,3 yet the
states have been slow to recognize a shift in society that is reflected
in a higher number of stepfamilies and a greater demand for sensitivity to the needs of those families.4 Perhaps the reason for this lag
* Law clerk to the Hon. William W. Caldwell, United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. Admitted to Pennsylvania Bar, 1992. J.D. University of Toledo College of Law, 1992. M.S.J. Northwestern University, 1988. B.S. Cornell University,
1987. Former editor-in-chief, The University of Toledo Law Review.
** Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Dayton, Ph.D. Ohio State University, 1983. M.A. Ohio State University, 1981. B.A. Cornell University, 1979. Current editor,
Family Relations. The authors wish to thank Professor Margaret Mahoney of the University
of Pittsburgh for allowing them access to an early draft of her upcoming book on stepfamily
law.
1. Note, Stepchildren and In Loco Parentis Relationships, 52 HARV. L. REV. 515
(1939).
2. For a worthwhile review of stepfamily law, circa 1970, see, Bernard J. Berkowitz,
Legal Incidents of Today's Step Relationship: Cinderella Revisited, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209 (1970)
(concluding that Cinderella's status had yet to be clarified). As a threshold matter, the authors
define stepfamilies as those in which a biological parent has remarried after divorce or death of
the first spouse and the second spouse does not formally adopt the biological parent's child or
children. If the second spouse adopted the children, that person would not be regarded as a
stepparent and the legal regime governing that person's relationship with the children would be
different than that which is the focus of this Article.
3. There are federal law aspects of the stepfamily situation, but they are largely outside
the scope of this Article and will be discussed only in passing. For an excellent treatment of
the effects of federal statutes on stepfamilies, see Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the
Federal Law, 48 U. PTT. L. REV. 491 (1987).
4. The United States Census Bureau now estimates that 40 per cent of all children
younger than 18 live in single-parent or stepparent situations. Paul J. Buser, The First Generation of Stepchildren, 25 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2 (1991). There were estimated to be 4.5 million
stepfamilies in the United States as of 1985. Kiernan, N.H. Empowers Stepparents in Divorces; Ability to Grant Visitation Rights Granted,THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1991, at 69.
A great many family law practitioners, judges, and professors are displeased with the slow

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1992

between societal change and legal change is a lack of understanding
and knowledge among state legislators (who would modify the statutory law) and state court judges (who would modify the common
law). Legislators and judges could learn much from the empirical
research of the social scientists who have been studying stepfamily
relations. In this Article, we hope to provide a foundation for those
in the law who might bring about change. 5
Part II of this Article offers a brief overview of the current state
of the law as it applies to stepfamilies in six areas: child support
requirements following divorce, visitation rights of stepparents after
divorce, custody rights of stepparents after divorce, intestacy statutes
and will construction as they apply to stepfamilies, wrongful death
statutes as they apply to stepfamilies, and the treatment of steprelatives in medical consent statutes. Part III reviews the social science
findings about the relationships within stepfamilies and how those
relationships differ from the presumptions of the current law. Part
IV defends the use of social science research in the law, argues for
reform, and suggests some ways in which the law could be made
more sensitive to stepfamilies. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II.

The Current State of the Law

A.

Child Support During the Remarriage and Following Divorce

1. Statutory Law.-Few states have enacted statutes to enforce child support obligations on stepparents during their remarriages. Currently, only five states have such statutes6 and they are
generally tied to common law considerations. For example, a Montana statute 7 only imposes a duty when the stepparent has previously
voluntarily assumed the duty of paying child support, and the
stepchild relies on such payment to his or her detriment. The statute
progress the law has made in recognizing new family structures. "Judges are trying with some
bewilderment to apply legal doctrines dating from the conventional 'Ozzie and Harriet' television era to evolving family configurations." Margolick, Child-Custody Cases Test Frontiers of
Family Law, N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5. See also, Kiernan, supra, noting that the
American Bar Association now has a section on stepfamily law; and Lynne Reaves, Stepparent
Rights, As Families Widen, So Do Issues, 69 A.B.A. J. 1013 (1983).
5. While this Article calls for legal changes based on a social science model, the authors
are well aware that such an approach is not without its critics. See infra notes 125-154 and
accompanying text.
6. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (Vernon 1979 and Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-6-217 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 15 (West 1987 and Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-09 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1992).
7. See supra note 6. See also, In re the Marriage of Schultz, 597 P.2d 1174 (Mont.
1979).
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thus enforces a form of equitable estoppel.8 The North Dakota and
Oklahoma statutes are similar. 9 North Dakota's law adds another
important dimension. The statute only obligates a stepparent to support a stepchild when "the child has been received into the stepparent's family."10 This brings in considerations of another common law
doctrine, that of in loco parentis. A stepparent who stands in loco
parentis to a child is viewed as having taken the place of a parent.1 1
Under this standard, it is virtually impossible to force a stepparent to
pay support, because the stepparent can terminate the in loco paren12
tis relationship at will.
In short, there is little in state statutes to enforce stepparent
support obligations during marriage. If the remarriage ends, there is
no statutory authority for enforcing stepparent support."3 One commentator explains this by noting that most legislators regard the
stepparent-stepchild relationship as "derivative," only existing because both parties are related to the same person - the biological
parent. Once that relationship ends, so does the stepparent-stepchild
relationship. ' Utah's statute, for example, expressly terminates any
obligation when the remarriage ends. 5
2. Common Law.-There is little judicially created law to impose child support obligations on a stepparent, either during or following a remarriage. In the absence of legislative action, courts have
been reluctant to impose duties. 6 Therefore, most of the devices
courts have employed are simply creative uses of long-standing com8. See supra note 6.
9. Id. See also, Mougey v. Salzwedel, 401 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1987) (court discussed
North Dakota's application of estoppel).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (1991).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979). See also, Carter v. Brodrick, 644
P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982) (court defined in loco parentis); Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1982) (court applied in loco parentis to stepparent custody action); Michelle W. v.
Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. 1985) (court defined in loco parentis);
Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984) (defining in loco parentis); Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1991) (defining in loco parentis).
12. Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 42 (1984). The doctrine of in loco parentis will be further
discussed at notes 17-21, infra. See also, Michelle W. v. Ronald W., supra note 11; Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, supra note 11.
13. Richard S. Victor, Michael A. Robbins, and Scott Bassett, Statutory Review of
Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q. 19, 24-25
(1991); see also Mahoney, supra note 12 at 52.
14. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 52-53. See also, Portuondo v. Portuondo, 570 So. 2d
1338 (Fl. Ct. App. 1990) (court noted that the end of the marriage terminates in loco parentis
status).
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1992).
16. R. Michael Redman, The Support of Children in Blended Families: A Call for
Change, 25 FAM. L.Q. 83, 86 (1991).
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mon law doctrines derived from equity and contract law.
(a) In Loco Parentis;- If a stepparent intends to take the
place of the missing biological parent, the stepparent may be deemed
to be in loco parentis.7 If a court determines that a stepparent intended to be in loco parentis, the- court might impose support obligations even in the absence of statutory authority. There are, however,
important limits on the doctrine. First, in loco parentis status effects
only a narrow legal relationship between the stepparent and the
stepchild. For instance, there is no effect on inheritance rights.' 8 Second, and most important, -the stepparent can voluntarily terminate
the relationship at will.' 9 This discretion makes enforcement of support obligations under the in loco parentis theory unlikely at best.20
Ordinarily, any in loco parentis relationship that existed during the
marriage is seen as ending at divorce. 2'
(b) Express or Implied Contract.-Another possible common law avenue for enforcement of stepparent support obligations is
the law of contracts. Formation of a contract generally requires an
offer, an acceptance, and some validation device, usually consideration.22 A few courts, in seeking to impose support requirements on
stepparents, have found these elements present in discrete cases. In
L. v. L., 2 3 a man married a woman knowing that she carried another
man's child. The woman asked her future husband if he would care
for her child and he expressly agreed to do so. The court took this as
a promise to act as a biological father, and imposed a post-divorce
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The requisite intent is often narrowly
construed. In Montell v. Dep't of Social and Health Serv., 775 P.2d 976 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989), the court held that a stepfather who agreed to care for his stepchildren while their
natural father was incarcerated did not intend to stand in loco parentis. Many courts are
reluctant to declare the existence of an in loco parentis relationship because they fear such
determinations will dissuade stepparents from developing close relationships with their
stepchildren. See, e.g., In Re The Marriage of Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa Ct. App.
1991) (contending that the use of in loco parentis doctrine would discourage stepparents from
becoming close to their stepchildren). One criterion courts have used to find an in loco parentis
relationship is financial support. See, e.g., Loomis v. State, 228 Cal. App.2d 820, 39 Cal. Rptr.
820 (1964) (holding that stepmother's provision of financial support could be a basis for a
finding of an in loco parentis relationship). For an excellent discussion of the doctrine, see
Margaret Mahoney's upcoming book on the topic of stepparents and the law.
18. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. MAHONEY, supra note 17.
21. See, e.g., Portuondo v. Portuondo,:570 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Amadeo v. Amadeo, 166 A.2d 397 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1960) (court held that in loco
parentisrelationship and support obligation end at divorce); Jackson v. Jackson,,278 A.2d 114
(D.C. 1971) (court held that, absent a clear stepparental intent to continue it, in loco parentis
relationship ends at divorce).
22. All Line, Inc. v. Rabar Corp., 919 F.2d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 1990).
23. 497 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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support obligation. 4 However, in the absence of an express written
agreement, an action for support would have little chance of success
and cases like L. v. L. are clearly aberrations.
(c) Equitable Estoppel.-In Clevenger v. Clevenger, the
California Court of Appeal enunciated a doctrine of equitable estoppel in stepparent support cases.2 5 The court wrote:
The relationship of father and child is too sacred to be thrown
off like an old cloak. The law is not so insensitive as to countenance the breach of an obligation in so vital and deep a relation26
ship, undertaken, partially fulfilled, and suddenly sundered.
That said, the court found the requisite components of estoppel:
a promise that the promisor expected would be relied upon, actual
27
reliance, and detriment to the promisee.
A number of recent cases have applied equity to stepparent support cases. In Miller v. Miller,8 the New Jersey Supreme Court
forced a stepfather to provide support because he had prevented the
biological father from doing So. 2 1 Professor Margaret Mahoney has
noted that Miller is a paradigm of estoppel cases in this area in that
the court only imposed liability because the biological father could
not pay. 0 In this way, she notes, courts have severely restricted the
use of equitable estoppel in stepparent support cases. 3 1
In summary, the legislatures and the courts have been slow to
impose stepparent support duties either during or after a marriage.
They have operated under an assumption that stepparent-stepchild
relationships are transitory in nature, offshoots of remarriages rather
than separate, enduring entities.
24. Id. Courts have, in the rare instances in which they have found contracts, determined that consideration could be found in the promise of the stepparent and the reliance of
the natural parent. In this sense, contract-based actions are anomalies; generally, child support
is owed the child rather than the custodial parent, yet the courts in these cases find contracts
between the parents. There is another issue addressed by Professor Mahoney, supra note 18. If
an express agreement is made between a natural parent and a stepparent, the Statute of
Frauds would surely be implicated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
Courts have paid little heed to this issue. However, in Byers v. Byers, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court used the Statute of Frauds to strike down an oral agreement in which a stepfather
allegedly promised to support his future wife's child by another man. 618 P.2d 930 (1980).
25. 11 Cal. Rptr 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
26. Id. at 716.
27. Id. at 714.
28. 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984). See also, In re Marriage of Ulrich v. Cornell, 469
N.W.2d 890 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the use of estoppel to impose support obligation), rev'd 484 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1992) (court agreed equitable estoppel is valid in the support situation, but not on the facts of this case).
29. Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
30. MAHONEY, supra note 17.
31.

Id.
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Visitation Following Divorce

Several statutes allow courts to order visitation following divorce between stepparents and their stepchildren. 32 All of the statutes revolve around the concept of the "best interests" of the child. 33
"Best interests" of the child is a nebulous concept, including such
factors as the age and health of the child, the character of the noncustodial parent, the emotional relationship between the child and
the visiting stepparent, the likely effect on the child, the likelihood
that the visitation will disrupt the child's life, and, sometimes, the
wishes of the child.34 In those states that have explicit statutes allowing stepparent or third-party visitation, courts have been willing
to order visitation when it would be in the "best interests" of the
child.
Even in the absence of statutory authority, several state courts
have applied a common law "best interests" of the child standard
and allowed stepparent visitation. For example, the Alabama Code
32. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (West 1983 and
Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1986 and Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 57146(7) (1985 and Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1983 and Supp. 1989); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West 1991 and Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 752
(1983 and Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 257.022 (1962 and Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §
93-14-(1-3) (1972 and Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(B) (Anderson 1989 and
Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1990 and
Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1986 and Supp. 1992); and WIs. STAT. ANN. §
767.245 (West 1981 and Supp. 1991). The statutes of California, Kansas, Tennessee, Virginia,
and Wisconsin specifically refer to stepparents, rather than simply "third parties." Tennessee
insists that the stepparent actually contribute toward the support of the child before the court
orders visitation.
33. Supra note 32. Some statutes explicitly refer to "best interests." See e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1986 and Supp. 1992) (court can grant visitation to "a person other
than a parent when visitation may serve the best interests of the child"). Other statutes are
less clear, but suggest a similar standard. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(B)
(Anderson 1989 and Supp. 1991) (court may grant visitation rights "to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.").
34. Gerber v. Gerber, 407 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Neb. 1987) (discussing the relevant factors
in a best interests analysis). One factor in the "best interests" analysis that has been controversial is the relationship between the custodial parent and the visiting stepparent. In Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, the custodial parent argued that the rancor between her and her former
husband made visitation not in the "best interests" of the child. The court was unsparing in its
criticism of the mother when it said:
[tihe wife is more interested in punishing the husband by denying him access to
her daughter than she is in doing what serves the girl's best interests. The girl is
not a piece of property; she is a living, breathing, and, as is any child, fragile
person who is seemingly already distraught by the destruction of what she has
known as her family. There is no need to further damage her by removing the
emotional support of one who has cared for her during the marriage.
Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Neb. 1991).
But see Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 805 P.2d 88 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (denying visitation on
the grounds that tension between the custodial parent and the stepparent would not serve the
best interests of the child).
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has no provision for third-party or stepparent visitation." However,
in Shoemaker v. Shoemaker,3 6 an Alabama appeals court upheld an
order for visitation between a stepfather and his stepson. The court
noted, "[sluch an award [of visitation] would not arise from the relationship or a legal privilege (as granted by statute to grandparents
...
) but from the inherent power of the court to act to promote the
best interests of the child."3 " In noting that there was no statutory or
common law right to visitation, the court also averred that a divorce
decree between the biological parent and the stepparent could not
create that right. The trial court alone could order such visitations
after it was convinced it would be in the "best interests" of the
38
child.
Indiana, like Alabama, has a statutory provision for visitation
by grandparents, but none for visitation by stepparents. Still, the Indiana Court of Appeals allowed visitation because it was in the "best
interests" of the child in In Re Custody of Banning. 9 In Banning,
the child's biological parents were divorced and her father received
custody. He remarried and the girl's stepmother developed a close,
parental relationship with her. When the father was killed in an accident, the court ordered that custody be returned to the biological
mother, but granted visitation rights to the stepmother because it
served the girl's "best interests." 4
The "best interests" standard is closely aligned with the in loco
parentis doctrine. Many courts that find an in loco parentis relationship have assumed that visitation would be in the best interests of
the child."1 The doctrine has some vigor in those jurisdictions in
which the statutes refer to "children of the marriage." Courts seeking to allow stepparent visitation must find a way to designate
stepchildren "children of the marriage," and the in loco parentis
doctrine has often afforded the opportunity. 2
35. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989 and Supp. 1991) allows grandparent visitation, but does
not provide for visitation by third-parties.
36. 563 So. 2d. 1032 (Ala Civ. App. 1990).
37. Id. at 1034 (citation omitted).
38. Id.
39. 541 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
40. Id.
41. Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that in loco parentis relati6nship could form the basis for a visitation order); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super.
1977) (noting that the lack of a blood relationship was not fatal to a visitation request); Bryan
v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). See also, Michael J. Lewinski, Visitation
Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 IND. L.J. 191 (1984).
42. In the oft-cited case of Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982), the Supreme Court of Alaska construed that state's now-amended visitation statute. The old statute
was a "children of the marriage" statute. The court used the in Ioco parentis doctrine to rule
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Courts have been more progressive in granting stepparent visitation than they have been in any other area of stepfamily law. Yet,
the differing standards of the various states continue to yield widely
varying results.
C.

Custody Following Divorce

There are now at least 25 states that statutorily provide for
courts to grant custody to third parties.4 3 Most of the statutes are
broad and refer to third parties, rather than to stepparents in particular.4 4 Almost universally, statutes give a clear preference to biological parents.4 5 A 1991 survey of state laws suggested that 38 states
have custodial presumptions in favor of biological parents.4" The
California statute is a good example. It sets out an order of preferences for the court. Custody should first be given to both (biological)
parents jointly or to either (biological) parent, then to the person or
persons in whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and
stable environment, and then to any other person deemed fit by the
court. 47 Hawaii's statute is the most liberal, dispensing with any

preference and allowing for custody to persons other than the biological parents when that custody is in the best interests of the child.4"
There are only a few states that even approach the broadness of Hawaii's standard. 49
In those states that give biological parents heavy presumptions
in custody disputes with third parties, there is usually some need for
the third party to show that the biological parent is unfit before the
court will award custody to the third party. 50 In Hutchison v. Hutchthat when stepparents stand in loco parentis to their stepchildren, the children can be "children of the marriage" for purposes of the visitation statute. A California Court of Appeal case,
Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), that refused to follow the
same analysis prompted the California legislature to amend the Civil Code to expressly include
stepparents. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4351.5 (West 1983 and Supp. 1992).
43. Victor, Robbins, and Bassett, supra note 13, at 20.
44. Id.
45. Id. See, e.g., In re JCP, 307 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (employing strong
biological parent preference); and Grover v. Phillips, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984) (citing
federal and state constitutions as making biological parent preference a "fundamental right").
46. Olvera v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). See also, Suzzette
M. Haynie, Biological Parents v. Third parties: Whose Right to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected? 20 GA. L. REV. 705 (1986); Stuhr v. Stuhr, 1992 Neb. LEXIS 91 (1992).
47. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(6) (West 1983 and Supp. 1992).
48.

HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1985 and Supp. 1990).

49. Haynie, supra note 46. See, e.g., McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984).
50. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Bancroft, 578 A.2d 114 (Vt. 1990) (court must only grant
custody to third party if biological parent is unfit and the award is in the best interests of the
child).
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ison,51 for example, the Utah Supreme Court held that the third
party would bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent: (1) had not formed a strong mutual
bond with the child; (2) had not shown a willingness to sacrifice his
own interests for those of the child; and (3) lacked the sympathy for
and the understanding of the child that, is typical of parents.5 2 Not
surprisingly, given such a high standard, the third party was unable
53
to meet the burden of proof.
In some jurisdictions, courts sympathetic to stepparents have
tried to use the in loco parentis doctrine to demonstrate that
stepchildren are "children of the marriage." 5 Such attempts have
been generally unsuccessful because the statutes are drafted in such
terms as to make an interpretation that includes stepparents
untenable.5 5
In summary, only in rare circumstances have courts granted
custody to third parties, and to stepparents in particular. The overwhelming presumptions in favor of biological parents have thwarted
almost all efforts.
D. Intestacy Statutes, Will Interpretation, and Stepfamilies
Intestacy statutes determine the division of a decedent's estate
in the absence of a valid will. The theory of intestacy statutes is to
set forth a plan that would meet the wishes of the average person if
he had made a will. 56 To that end, a typical intestacy scheme will
give, in whole or in part, first to the surviving spouse, then to the
biological children, then to the decedent's parents, then to the decedent's siblings, and then to the state.57 Few states in their intestacy
schemes provide for stepchildren or stepparents. Several state statutes expressly forbid stepchildren from taking in intestacy. 58 A few
states allow stepchildren to take, but only if the alternative is that
59
the estate would escheat to the state.
In some jurisdictions that exclude stepparents and stepchildren,
51. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 63.
55. Id. See, e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 258 P.2d 475 (Wash. 1953) (construing statutory
language narrowly).
56. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills,
22 U. C. DAvis L. REV. 917, 918 (1989)..
57. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103, and 2-105 (1983).
58. See. e.g., MINN. STAT. § 524.1-201(3) (West 1962 and Supp. 1992); see also, Thurn
v. McAra, 130 N.E.2d 887 (Mich. 1964).
59. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(1) (Anderson 1989 and Supp. 1991).
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courts have attempted to include steprelatives in intestacy by resort
to a doctrine known as equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel.
This doctrine allows a stepchild to take under an intestacy scheme if
there was a "contract" for the stepparent to adopt the child and the
child performed fully his obligations under the contract but the stepparent was unable to complete the adoption before his death. 60 In
such a circumstance, the stepchild would be allowed to take as if he
were a biological child of the decedent. Ordinarily, this doctrine is of
little help to stepchildren; courts are quick to assume that there is no
contract to adopt in a stepfamily because the courts assume that if
there were an intent, the adoption would have occurred. 61 Therefore,
a claim of equitable adoption, the only theory available to most
62
stepchildren, is almost never successful.
There are also issues of great importance in the context of wills.
With wills, unlike with intestacy, the object is to effectuate the specific wishes of a particular decedent.63 Therefore, if the will makes
an express gift to a steprelative ("I leave $5,000 to my stepson,
Paul"), there should be no problem. 4 The problems in will interpretation generally arise when there is a class gift. Class gifts are general gifts made to a group of people (e.g., "I leave $5,000 each to all
of my children.") The question presented in the example is whether
a stepchild is included in that class.6 5 In most jurisdictions, it will
fall to the steprelative to prove that the class included the steprelative.66 Thus burdened, most steprelatives have been unsuccessful in
such actions.
E. Wrongful Death Statutes and Stepfamilies
Courts have generally not allowed stepchildren to bring actions
under wrongful death statutes for the deaths of stepparents,6 7 and
60. See, e.g., C Street Foodland v. Estate of Renner, 596 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1979)
(setting forth factors to be considered in equitable adoption analysis); see also, Mahoney,
supra note 56. If the adoption were completed, the child would typically be treated the same
as a biological child.
61. See, e.g., Estate of Stewart, 176 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding no
intent by stepparent to adopt stepchild).
62. Intestacy statutes are kinder to relatives of the half-blood. In most statutes, they are
treated the same as whole-blood relatives. Therefore, in most states half-brothers and halfsisters can inherit from each other. Mahoney, supra note 56, at 918.
63. Mahoney, supra note 56, at 940.
64. Mahoney, supra note 56, at 940.
65. See. e.g., Cavers v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 531 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(will specified "daughters" and court excluded stepdaughter).
66. Id. at 941. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gehl, 159 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 1968) (holding
stepchildren were able to prove intent).
67. See Annotation, Action for Death of Stepparent By or For Benefit of Stepchild, 68
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there are no recorded cases in which courts have allowed actions by
stepparents when their stepchildren have died. 68 Most wrongful
death statutes carefully list those who can bring actions. 9 While
they generally list "children" of the decedent, courts often exclude
stepchildren from consideration. 0
F.

Treatment of Steprelatives in Medical Decisionmaking Statutes

An emerging area of the law involves questions about who can
legally give consent to either initiate or terminate medical treatment
of an incompetent. 71 The issue was thrust into the public eye in two
prominent cases, In re Quinlan72 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health.7" In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court
awarded guardianship to the father of Karen Ann Quinlan, who had
become incompetent as a result of consuming alcohol and drugs. 74
Joseph Quinlan sought the guardianship so that he could order the
termination of treatment to allow Karen Ann to die. The court's rationale in granting the guardianship is largely outside the scope of
this Article, but it is important to note that the court believed the
father was best qualified to make the decision on behalf of Karen. 5
Cruzan involved a similar situation. There, a 25-year-old woman fell into a persistent vegetative state after an automobile accident. 7' Her parents fought for the right to disconnect her nutrition
and hydration.7 7 The case arose in Missouri, where there was a living will statute. 78 The patient, Nancy Beth Cruzan, however, had
not executed such a document. The Missouri Supreme Court held
A.L.R. 3d 1220, 1224 (1976). See also, Michael J. Markoff, Note, Stepfamily Law: Review
and Proposalsfor Change, 18 SUFFOLK L. REV. 701, 704-05 (1984).
68. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 3724(a) (1981 and Supp. 1991) ("An action [for
wrongful death] shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent or child or the deceased
person."). Some states are gradually adding to that basic list. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1662-102 (1987 and Supp. 1991) ("The beneficiaries are ... persons standing in loco parentis to
the deceased person and persons to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis."). WASH. REv.
CODE § 4.20.020 (1986 and Supp. 1992) ("including stepchildren").
70. See, e.g., Klossner v. San Juan County, 605 P.2d 330 (Wash. 1980); Brown v.
Brown, 309 S.E.2d 586 (Va. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984) (holding that stepchildren were not within the statutory term "children.").
71. Typically, incompetent patients are those who for some reason can not make medical
decisions for themselves. Usually, such people are in irreversible comas or persistent vegetative
states.
72. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
73. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at -.
77.

78.

497 U.S. at -.
MO. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1992).

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1992

that, absent a directive, Cruzan's parents would have to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that she would have wanted her nutrition and hydration discontinued.7 9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine if Missouri had the right to demand
clear and convincing evidence80 and eventually determined that the
state could do so.8 1
Cruzan pointed strongly to the need for adults to execute living
wills so that, in the event that they become incompetent, their wishes
would be followed. Even with the message of Cruzan as incentive,
more than 80 percent of Americans have not executed such documents. 8 2 An increasing number of states make allowances for failure
to execute living wills in what are called "non-declarant" provisions."s These statutes allow family members to give consent to begin
or terminate medical treatment when patients are incompetent and
84
have reached certain prescribed medical conditions.
The "non-declarant" statutes set out lists establishing the priority in which other people can make medical decisions for the incompetent. The preference is nearly identical in all of the states which
79. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988).
80. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
81. 497 U.S. at (1990). On August 30, 1990, the Cruzans again petitioned the
Probate Court to examine the evidence and hear new evidence to determine if Nancy's intent
could be determined by clear and convincing evidence. The state chose not to contest the hearing and the court, on December 14, 1990, ruled that Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube be disconnected. She died the day after Christmas. N.Y. TIMES, December 26, 1990, at 1.

82.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE,

Feb. 16, 1992, at 10.

83. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-214 (1987 and Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §
21-2210 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (West 1986 and Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §
16-8-12-4 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
1299.53 (West 1991 and Supp. 1992); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 707 (1983 and Supp.
1991); and MD. (Health - General] CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1990 and Supp. 1991).
84. A good example is the North Carolina provision:
(a) If a person is comatose and there is no reasonable possibility that he will
return to a reasonable sapient state or is mentally incapacitated, and:
(1) It is determined by the attending physician that the person's present condition is:
(a) Terminal; and
(b) Incurable; or
(c) Diagnosed as persistent vegetative state; and
(2) There is confirmation of the person's present condition as set out
above in this subsection, in writing by a physician other than the attending physician; and
(3) A vital function of the person could be restored by extraordinary
means or a vital function of the person is being sustained by extraordinary means; or
(4) The life of the person could be or is being sustained by artificial
nutrition or hydration;
then, extraordinary means or artificial nutrition or hydration may be withheld or
discontinued in accordance with subsection (b).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1991).
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permit decisions to be made by relatives in the folowing order of
priority:
(1)A legal guardian of the patient, if one has been
appointed;
(2)In the case of an unmarried patient under the age of
eighteen (18), the parents of the patient;
(3) The patient's spouse;
(4)The patient's adult child, or, if there is more than one
(1), then a majority of the patient's adult children participating
in the decision;
(5) The parents of a patient over the age of eighteen (18);
(6)The patient's adult sibling, or, if there is more than one
(1), then a majority of the patient's adult siblings participating
in the decision;
(7) Persons standing in loco parentis to the patient;
(8)A majority of the patient's adult heirs at law who participate in the decision.8
The statutes, in many respects, seem to seek the same goal as intestacy statutes. They establish the scheme that the patient would have
set out in a living will if he had prepared one.
While the "non-declarent" statutes are too recently enacted for
there to be a large body of case law interpreting them,8 6 the statutes
clearly raise questions for those examining stepfamily law and those
issues have yet to be addressed in any forum. It is not difficult to
envision a situation in which a patient would name a steprelative in a
living will as the person to make medical decisions on his or her
behalf. 87 Given that scenario, and the likely aim of the "non-declarant" statutes to effect the supposed will of the patient, courts might
well find themselves in an interpretive maze. The statutes speak of a
patient's "adult child," "parent," or "adult sibling." There is little
allowance for steprelatives or some other third parties who might
have been named in a living will. The Arkansas statute8 8 mentions
those standing in loco parentis to the patient, which would likely
allow a stepparent who met that standard to make decisions.
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-214 (1987 and Supp. 1991).
86. No citations were discovered in a series of LEXIS searches conducted on November
20, 1992. The query was .... non-declarant" w/5 statute and "living will' "' and the searches
were executed in the States library, Omni file and the Genfed library, Courts file.
87. Imagine, for example, a situation in which a couple marries late in life and the
husband already has three children and the wife has none. If the wife were to establish close
relationships with the children, she might well want them to make decisions for her if
necessary.
88. See supra notes 83 and 85 and accompanying text.
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However, the more likely scenario is that of a stepchild seeking
to assert the right to make decisions for a stepparent or of an adult
stepsibling attempting to assert the right to make decisions for a
stepsibling. The only provision in the statute is for the patient's
"adult children" or "adult siblings" to make such decisions. As
noted, there are as yet no court decisions interpreting these statutes
in the stepfamily context. It seems possible, though, that a court
faced with this sort of situation would look to the rules of probate.8 9
In that setting, there are two alternatives: the laws of intestacy and
the rules of will construction. If the court chose to use intestacy
analysis, which would be likely given the parallels between "non-declarant" statutes and intestacy statutes, stepchildren or stepsiblings
would presumably have no rights to make medical decisions." If a
court followed precedent for will construction, the steprelative would
bear a heavy burden to prove that the patient would have wanted the
steprelative to take part in decisionmaking.9 1 In either line of analysis, then, the likely outcome would not favor the steprelative who
desires to make medical decisions for an incompetent steprelative.
Finally, the same question of construction could arise in the living will situation as in the testamentary will situation.9" If a patient
has designated a class of people to make decisions, the boundaries of
that class might well be unclear. For example, if A designates "my
adult children" and there are two stepchildren and one biological
child, how should a court rule in the event of a disagreement? 9"
89. The construction of a living will is rather like that of a testamentary will. Also, most
statutes dealing with living wills grant jurisdiction to the probate courts. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2133.09 (Anderson 1990 and Supp. 1991). While there is little in the legal
literature about interpretation of living will statutes, the parallels to testamentary wills are
worthy of note. The Ohio statute sets forth an execution procedure, for example, that is remarkably similar to that for testamentary wills. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.02.03 (Anderson 1989 and Supp. 1991) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (Anderson 1989
and Supp. 1991).
90. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
92. Currently, as noted, only one-fifth of Americans have signed living wills. Supra note
73 and accompanying text. However, that number will almost assuredly rise in the near future.
There are now forty-two states with living will statutes and thirty-six with durable health-care
power of attorney statutes (a durable health-care power of attorney can serve many of the
same functions as a living will). James Rodgers, Matters of Life and Death: Debate Grows
Over Euthanasia, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 63. Also, newly-enacted federal legislation forces
health care facilities to educate patients about their legal rights regarding medical decisionmaking. Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1), 1396a(a) (1991). The federal mandate is enforced only against institutions receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding.
Id.
93. These are areas as yet unexplored in the case law.
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G. Summary of Current Law

Stepfamily relationships are generally not recognized as close
and enduring under most current legal theories. Courts are reluctant
to enforce child support obligations against stepparents, and must
resort to common law legal fictions when they do. Many states allow
for third-party visitation following divorce, but those third parties,
including stepparents, must often show that the visitation is in the
"best interests" of the child. In child custody cases, there is almost
universally a strong presumption in favor of biological parents, and
third parties often must prove parental unfitness in order to receive
custody. Most intestacy statutes do not recognize any ties between
stepparents and their stepchildren and will construction cases presumptively disfavor steprelatives being included in class gifts.
Wrongful death statutes are generally not receptive to steprelative
claims. Finally, "non-declarant" statutes and living wills raise serious interpretive issues in the stepfamily context.
III.

Social Science Findings

Two areas of social science research have provided information
relevant to the validity of current legal theories related to stepfamilies. First, empirical research has assessed the quality of stepparentstepchild relationships, and, further, has identified those stepchildren
who are most likely to have positive relationships with stepparents.
Second, a body of literature has examined phenomena identified as
"role ambiguity" and "role conflict" and how they relate to adjustment in stepfamilies.94
A.

Quality of Stepparent-Stepchild Relationships

Empirical investigations have consistently found that stepparent-stepchild relationships are perceived by many to be inferior to
parent-child relationships." However, actual differences in quality
94. Research related to how parents in stepfamilies manage their finances, which may
be relevant to the issue of imposing support duties on stepparents following divorce, is relatively scarce. Lawrence H. Coleman and Marilyn H. Ganong, Remarriage and Stepfamily
Research in the 1980s: Increased Interest in an Old Family Form, 52 J. OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAM. 925, 936 (1990). Therefore, given the lack of empirical evidence, it will not be
considered further in this article.
95. James L. Peterson and Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-ChildRelationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 295, 298
(1986); Frank F. Furstenberg, The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents and
Children After Remarriage in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: CURRENT RESEARCH AND
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have generally been found to be small" and some stepparents and
stepchildren have reported that, over time, they have been able to
establish relationships that were mutually supportive and enduring.9 7
These findings suggest that it may be beneficial for both stepparents
and stepchildren to have continued contact should the remarriage
end in divorce. 8
The perceived quality of stepparent-stepchild relationships is related to a variety of factors. Stepparent-stepchild relationships, in
general, have been found to be more positive in the case of: (a)
younger as opposed to older children;99 (b) stepfathers as opposed to
stepmothers; 10° (c) boys as opposed to girls, particularly in stepfather
families; 101 (d) stepmothers whose children have little contact with
their noncustodial mothers;' 0 2 (e) "simple" as opposed to "complex"
stepfamilies; 0° and (f) remarried parents who themselves have not
had children of their own. 0 4 It should be noted that these findings
represent small differences among the various groups and that there
are important differences within each of the groups.
Not only can stepparents and stepchildren have enduring bonds,
but the quality of these relationships directly affects the adjustment
of the children and the new spouses to the remarriage. The quality of
42, 54 (K. Pasley & M. Ihinger-Tallman eds. 1987) [hereinafter "Current
Research"].
96. Coleman and Ganong, supra note 94, at 931.
97. Charles Hobart, Parent-Child Relations in Remarried Families, 8 J. OF FAM. ISSUES
259, 275 (1987); Lawrence H. Ganong and Marilyn H. Coleman, Stepchildren's Perceptions
of Their Parents, 148 J. OF GENETIC PSYCH. 5, 12, 13, 15 (1987).
98. Although not the primary focus of this article, it should be noted that stepsibling
bonds can be strong and a source of support following divorce. Ihinger-Tallman, Sibling and
Stepsibling Bonding in Stepfamilies, in CURRENT RESEARCH, 175-76.
99. W. Glenn Clingempeel, Eulalee Brand, and Sion Segal, A Multilevel-MultivariableDevelopmental Perspective for Future Research on Stepfamilies in CURRENT RESEARCH,
supra note 96, at 73; Hobart, supra note 97, at 267.
100. Hobart, supra note 98, at 267; Anne-Marie Ambert, Being a Stepparent: Live-in
and Visiting Stepchildren, 48 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 795, 798-99 (1986). Furstenberg, supra note 96, at 54.
101. W. Glenn Clingempeel, Richard levoli, and Eulalee Brand, StructuralComplexity
and the Quality of Stepfather-Stepchild Relationships, 23 FAM. PROCESS 547, 556 (1984).
Hetherington, Cox, and Cox, Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage on the Adjustment of Children, 24 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCH. 518, 529 (1985).
102. W. Glenn Clingempeel and Segal, Stepparent-Stepchild Relationships and the
Psychological Adjustment of Children in Stepmother and Stepfather Families, 57 CHILD
DEV. 474, 481. Furstenberg, supra note 95, at 55.
103. "Simple" stepfamilies are those in which only one spouse has brought children into
the newly formed stepfamily. "Complex" stepfamilies are those in which both spouses bring
children to live in the newly formed stepfamily. Santrock and Sitterle, Parent-ChildRelationships in Stepmother Families, in CURRENT RESEARCH, supra note 95, at 289.
104. Id. Contrary findings were reported by Lawrence H. Ganong and Marilyn H. Coleman, Do Mutual Children Cement Bonds in Stepfamilies?, 50 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM.
687, 695 (1988).
THEORY
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stepparent-stepchild relationships has been empirically associated
with stepchildren's academic achievement, behavior problems, emotional distress, and peer relations.' 0 5 Further, several studies have
found that the quality of the relationships between stepparents and
106
stepchildren is related to remarital satisfaction and conflict.
The nature of these studies makes it inappropriate to conclude
that a positive stepparent-stepchild relationship is the sole cause of
positive child and remarital adjustment or that termination of the
stepparent-stepchild relationship would negatively affect adjustment.
Rather, a reasonable interpretation of the findings is that the quality
of steprelationships is one among many factors that influence child
and marital adjustment in stepfamilies. Importantly, these findings
are inconsistent with the legal notion that steprelationships are important only as long as the remarriage endures. 10 7 Simply put, an
enduring relationship is not given borders by legislatures and
courts. 0 8 These potential bonds are noted in the notion of "psychological parenthood," introduced by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit. 0 9
They suggested that custody of children should be gender-neutral
and should be awarded to the "psychological parent," the one that
has formed the primary psychological bond." 0
105. Peterson and Zill, supra note 95, at 300.
106. Myron Orleans, Bartolomeo J. Palisi, and David Caddell, Marriage Adjustment
and Satisfaction of Stepfathers: Their Feelings and Perceptions of Decision Making and
Stepchildren Relations, 38 FAM. REL. 371, 375 (1989). Researchers have found an exception
in stepmother families in which the stepchildren include girls. In such families, the quality of
stepparent-stepchild relationships is negatively related to marital satisfaction. Brand and W.
Glenn Clingempeel, The Interdependence of Marital and Stepparent-Stepchild Relationships
and Children's Psychological Adjustment: Research Findings and Clinical Implications, 36
FAM. REL. 140, 144 (1987).
107. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 52-53; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
108. Although they are rare, there are courts that have recognized these bonds.
Woodford [the stepfather] and the mother of these children during the period of
their helplessness in their early infancy necessarily cared for them day and
night. They unquestionably shared with them in all their childish joys and disappointments to the date of their mother's death in November, 1956. In that tragic
event Woodford walked beside them in their hour of supreme need into the
greatest depth of despair to which the human heart can descend or is ever called
upon to endure. The evidence showed he loved them as he did his own and they
unstintedly returned his love in full measure . . . . There is a deep-seated desire
in the breast of every person, whether child or adult, to have someone care about
their welfare to whom they may anchor and find peace and contentment in the
knowledge that they do care. Jacqueline and Gretchen have found such an
anchor in [their stepfather].
Clifford v. Woodford, 320 P.2d 452 (Ariz. 1957).
109. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
110. Id. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD has had a tremendous impact on
the area of family law, yet it has also been the subject of considerable criticism in both law
and psychology. See Henderson v. Lessley, 387 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala. 1980) (citing with ap-
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Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict in Stepfamilies

Professor Andrew Cherlin has provided an influential analysis of
some of the psychosocial difficulties experienced by stepfamily members.'
He proposed that remarriage is an "incomplete institution," 1 2 meaning that there are few institutional guidelines and
norms to assist stepfamily members in adjusting to their changed
circumstances. In first-marriage families, roles regarding discipline,
childrearing, and support are well-established and well-known. This
is not the case in stepfamilies. For example, stepparents may not-be
clear about whether they should be "parents", "friends", or "supportive adults" to their stepchildren. As a result of such role ambiguity, relationships may become strained and family conflict may develop. Cherlin hypothesized that this lack of "social wisdom" may
partially explain the slightly higher divorce rate for remarriages
when compared to first marriages." 1
Although empirical tests of Cherlin's hypothesis have yielded
mixed results," 4 clinicians working with stepfamilies have widely accepted the importance of role clarity." 5 Ambiguity regarding the
stepparent role, in particular, has been described as the core difficulty encountered in stepfamilies." 6 In stepfather families, Professors Lawrence Kurdek and Mark A. Fine demonstrated that the extent of ambiguity about the role of the stepfather was negatively
related to mothers' satisfaction with their family, marital, and individual lives and to stepfathers' satisfaction with their roles as parents." 7 In addition, in another study, the extent to which young adoproval); Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 455 (1983) (offering criticism).
111. Andrew Cherlin, Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution, 84 AM. J. OF Soc. 634,
642-43 (1978).
112. Id.
113. Glick, Marriage,Divorce, and Living Arrangements: Prospective Changes, 5 J. OF
FAM. ISSUES 7, 20 (1984).
114. W. Glenn Clingempeel, Quasi-Kin Relationships and Marital Quality in Stepfather Families, 41 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 890, 890-898 (1981); Clingempeel,
Brand and Segal, supra note 100, at 78; F. FURSTENBERG AND G. SPANIER, RECYCLING THE
FAMILY: REMARRIAGE AFTER DIVORCE 191-92 (1984); Andrew . Schwebel, Mark A. Fine,
and Maureena A. Renner, A Study of Perceptions of the Stepparent Role, 12 J. OF FAM.
ISSUES 43, 49 (1991).
115. Margaret Crosbie-Burnett, Application of Family Stress Theory to Remarriages:
A Model for Assessing and Helping Stepfamilies, 38 FAM. REL. 323, 326 (1989); Mark A.
Fine and Andrew I. Schwebel, Stepparent Stress: A Cognitive Perspective, 17 J. OF DIVORCE
AND REMARRIAGE 1, 4 (1991); E. VISHER AND J. VISHER, OLD LOYALTIES, NEW TIES 146
(1988).
116. Fine.and Schwebel, supra note 115, at 4.
117. Lawrence A. Kurdek and Mark A. Fine, Cognitive Correlates of Adjustment for
Mothers and Stepfathers in Stepfather Families, 53 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 565, 569
(1991).
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lescents experienced ambiguity about the roles of their stepmothers
was negatively related to their perceived self-competence.1 18
While role ambiguity is an intrapsychic construct," 9 role conflict refers to the consistency or compatibility of beliefs between and
among stepfamily members. 20 Because of the presence of role ambiguity, individuals in stepfamilies are particularly vulnerable to having different beliefs and expectations about their various roles.1 21 For
example, at the time of remarriage, some stepparents have little intention of participating in child-rearing activities. In such cases, if
the new spouse/biological parent expects that he or she is gaining a
parental aid by virtue of the remarriage, marital conflict may result. 22 Similarly, while many stepparents assume they should funcnot
tion as disciplinarians of their stepchildren, the children may
1 23
authority.
stepparent
against
rebel
may
and
share this belief
C. Summary of Social Science Findings
These findings suggest that the lack of clarity about roles in
stepfamilies may exacerbate adjustment difficulties. While no empirical evidence has linked the lack of clarity in the law with the role
ambiguities in stepfamilies,124it is plausible and reasonable to believe
that there is a connection.
IV.
A.

Recommendations For Reform
Use of Social Science In Law
1. In the Courts.-We believe, as a principal matter, that law

118. Mark A. Fine, Lawrence A. Kurdek, and Lorraine Hennigen, Perceived Self-Competence and Its Relations to Stepfamily Myths and (Step)ParentRole Ambiguity in Adolescents from Stepfather and Stepmother Families, 6 J. OF FAM. PSYCH. 69, 73 (1992). As used
here, self-competence is a person's belief that he can perform the behaviors necessary to
achieve desirable positive outcomes. The notion is similar to self-esteem.
119. An intrapsychic construct is a psychological notion manifested in one person. In
describing role ambiguity, we refer to the possible confusion of any individual within the
stepfamily.
120. To help define the difference between role ambiguity and role conflict, imagine a
stepfamily in which a widow with two sons marries a man. If that man is unsure what role he
should play toward his stepsons, he has role ambiguity. If the man believes he should be a
"father" and the stepsons believe he should be a "friend," the three have role conflict.
121. Mark A. Fine and Lawrence A. Kurdek, A Multidimensional Cognitive-Developmental Model of Stepfamily Adjustment in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: RESEARCH,
).
THEORY, AND PRACTICE (K. Pasley and M. Ihinger-Tallman eds. 19
122. Crosbie-Burnett, supra note 115, at 328.
123. Fine and Schwebel, supra note 115, at 6.
124. Mark A. Fine, A Social Science Perspective on Stepfamily Law: Suggestions for
Legal Reform, 38 FAM. REL. 53, 55 (1989); Mark A. Fine and David R Fine, Recent Changes
in Laws Affecting Stepfamilies: Suggestions for Legal Reform, 41 FAM. REL. 334, 338 (1992).
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and social science must, in some way, go hand-in-hand. 12 5 Justice
Felix Frankfurter succinctly described the necessary interrelationships of the disciplines:
Progress in the natural sciences is-not remotely confined to findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this
true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of
what are called the social sciences. The problems that are the
respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology, and related areas of scholarship are merely
departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of
analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. 2 '
There are a number of instances in which courts have delved
into social science research and allowed those data to inform their
decisions. An early, and perhaps not particularly laudable, example
is Justice Louis Brandeis' approach in Muller v. Oregon,'27 a case
arising from a challenge to an Oregon statute that prevented women
from working more than ten hours a day in factories. Brandeis filed
his now-well-known "Brandeis Brief" that detailed the results of various social science studies that described the differences between the
genders. 12 8 Based on Brandeis' introduction of the studies, the Court
upheld the Oregon statute. 2 9
In a more enduring result, Chief Justice Earl Warren examined
social science findings about the effects of segregation on black children in his majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 30 Warren wrote that the continuing validity of the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson'' had to be judged
against findings that while the facilities afforded black children
seemed equal, the effects of the separation were more far-reach125. There are a great many ways in which this is already clearly the case. For example,
many of the Federal Rules of Evidence derive from psychology. FED. R. EvID. 404, for example, disallows most forms of character evidence used to show conformity therewith. The reason,
certainly, must be that juries might decide that a person did or did not do some act based on
what the person did in the past, rather than based on the facts of the case at bar. G. LILLY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.2 (2d ed. 1987). See also, Beryl Blaustone,
Teaching Evidence: Storytelling in the Classroom, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 465 (1992). Rule
404 is an example of a rule of law based on belief about human psychology.
126. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-62 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
127. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
128. Id. at 423.
129. Id.
130. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
131. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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ing. 32 Relying on a number of studies by social scientists, the Court
overruled Plessy and barred segregation in public schools. 133
These examples, however, do not point to a trend. On the contrary, courts have been slow to embrace the findings of social science. For example, the United States Supreme Court, in Manson v.
Brathwaite3 examined a criminal procedure case involving an identification of a suspect made by a police officer.13 5 The Court ignored
a line of cases urging caution in the name of due process and allowed
a highly suggestive identification to stand.13 Justice Harry Blackmun, in the opinion of the Court, argued that the identification bore
indicia of reliability because "Glover [the officer] was a trained police officer" ' and because Glover was certain of his identification:
"Glover ...testified: 'There is no question whatsoever.' "138 The majority ignored the pleas of Justice Thurgood Marshall, who wrote in
dissent that:
In my view, this conclusion totally ignores the lessons of Wade.
The dangers of mistaken identification are ...

simply too great

to permit unnecessarily suggestive identifications. Neither Biggers nor the Court's opinion today points to any contrary empirical evidence. Studies since Wade have only reinforced the validity of its assessment of the dangers of identification testimony.139
The majority ignored his entreaty.1""
2. In the Literature.-There have been several discussions of
the relative merits of conforming the law to the results of social science research.' In 1951, Professor David Riesman noted that there
132. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
133. Id.
134. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
135. Id. at 98.
136. Id.at 117.
137. Id.at 108.
138. Id.at 115.
139. 432 U.S. at 125 (Marshall, J. dissenting)(citations omitted). Marshall noted several articles and studies that pointed to the now-notorious unreliability of eyewitness identification, even when the eyewitnesses are police officers.
140. Id. at 117. More recent surveys have punctuated the notion that the Court's intuition was wrong. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus of the University of Washington at Seattle has studied
eyewitness reliability. In direct contradiction to Justice Blackmun's assertions, she found that
(1)police officers are no better witnesses that lay people and (2) a witness' certainty in his
identification bears little or no relationship to his accuracy. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (G. Wells & E. Loftus, eds 1984).
141. See, e.g., David Riesman, Some Observationson Law and Psychology, 19 U. CHI.
L. REV. 30 (1951); Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in
Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 107; Bersoff,
Psychologists and the Judicial System, 10 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 151 (1986) (describing history of legal use of social science data); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not:
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has long been an uneasy relationship between law and psychology, in
particular: ". . . the meeting grounds are rather like the parlor in a
Victorian home in which the girl and her suitor can get together but not get together too much."1""
Professor David Faigman has more recently examined the debate from both sides."4 3 He notes that those who urge that
lawmakers have a greater reliance on social science research tend to
believe that there is "special expertise" among the social scientists
and that whatever amount of social science data there might be is
better than legal "guesswork."' 4 Those critics of the social science
approach, he writes, doubt whether current social science research is
reliable and whether it "can ever be scientific."' 4 5 Faigman posits
that both sides miss the point of the debate: the supporters failing to
adequately shore up the validity of the social science approach and
the critics failing to properly describe the failings of social science. 6
Faigman argues that social science research is given greater credibility than its methodology or accuracy merit. He suggests that social
science research used in the courts be subject to the conventional
tests for admission of scientific data, 4 " either the Frye"8 test or the
149
general reliability test.
Professor Martha Fineman and Anne Opie, a family therapist
in New Zealand, have provided a spirited attack on the widespread
belief that social science research is somehow "objective," devoid of
political or ideological taint. 60 They argue that legal scholars and
theorists are all too quick to take social science findings as "fact"
and give them absolutist credibility.' 5 ' Fineman and Opie urge that
legal policymakers and scholars cast a more critical eye on social
science research. 5 2
Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005
(1989).
142. Riesman, supra note 141, at 32.
143. Id.
144. Faigman, supra note 141, at 1008.
145. Id. at 1008-09.
146. Id. at 1009.
147. Id. at 1095.
148. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test requires
that the trial judge decide whether the scientific process or method has gained general acceptance in the scientific community.
149. See, e.g., U.S. v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). This test leaves the
question of the validity of the scientific evidence to the judge himself, rather than requiring
him to "count noses" in the scientific community.
150. Supra note 141.
151. Fineman & Opie, supra note 141, at 110, 125.
152. Id. at 124. In their article, Fineman and Opie use as an example a piece by University of Michigan Law Professor David Chambers. David C. Chambers, Rethinking the Sub-
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3. A Reasoned Approach to the Relevance of Using Social
Science Research in Lawmaking.-There is certainly room for debate about the proper application of social science research to legal
reformation. We believe that the application is often appropriate,
and that the areas of stepfamily law to which this Article addresses
itself prove a valid use. The studies cited have been conducted with
the same methodological rigor as that applied to other sciences, such
as chemistry and physics. The critical reader may argue that chemistry and physics deal with reactions in physical science with exact,
predictable outcomes and precise measurements, while social science
deals with human behavior, which is often less easily measured and
predicted. This is true, but to use this contention to cast off the use
of social science research in law would be to ignore a wealth of information, albeit not applicable to every individual case, but nonetheless considerably better than the conjectures of judges and
legislators. 153
Further, the process by which social science findings are reported lends itself to rather high professional accuracy. Virtually all
articles published in social science, for example, are anonymously reviewed by professional peers of the authors, assuring that the methods used and the conclusions reached are sound.' 54 Finally, none of
stantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MicH. L. REV. 477 (1984). Chambers fired
back a response to Fineman and Opie, essentially arguing that they took his work out of context and that they misconstrued his approach. David C. Chambers, The Abuses of Social
Science: A Response to Fineman and Opie, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 159. Fineman answered in that
same issue of the Wisconsin Law Review. Martha L. Fineman, A Reply to David Chambers,
1987 Wis. L. REV. 165.
153. As any first-year law student who has studied the Rule Against Perpetuities in
Real Property or the Mailbox Rule in Contracts can attest, the law is often predicated upon
arcane and unexplainable rules far less reasonable than almost any social science finding. See
Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation by Promise and the Need for Revision
of the Mailbox Rule, 79 Ky. L.J. 557 (1991) (calling for reform of the mailbox rule because it
is archaic). Rules based on research findings, even ones subject to criticism, must be better
than those based on conjecture.
154. Again, the critic will answer that one social scientist is unlikely to criticize the
validity of another social scientist's work, given that his professional life depends upon the
worth of just the sort of work he is called upon to criticize. This may be, but that same social
scientist/evaluator, therefore, has a vested interest in the respectability and integrity of work
in his field, because the respect accorded his field will be reflected in the respect accorded his
own work. In fact, social science articles are subject to a considerably greater pre-publication
evaluation than law review articles. Law review articles are cite-checked and edited almost
exclusively by students who have little or no knowledge of whether the assertions in the articles
are valid. That said, we do not intend to criticize the law review process (especially given that
one of the authors of this article served as a law review editor-in-chief ). Law reviews afford
writers greater freedom than many other professional journals and they allow writers to express new and often innovative ideas without the possibly blunting effect of peer review. But
see, Roger C. Cramton, The Most Remarkable Institution: The American Law Review, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1986); Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student-Edited Journals: In
Response to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122.
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the assertions of social scientists noted here are controversial or
counterintuitive. We therefore believe that there is validity to the use
of social science research in stepfamily law reformation.
B.

Current Attempts to Reform Stepfamily Law

There are a number of suggested reforms in the literature and
from professional organizations.
1. ABA Proposed Model Act EstablishingRights and Duties
of Stepparents.-The Family Law Section Council of the American
Bar Association has proposed a model act that considers stepparents'
obligations to provide child support and rights to discipline, visitation, and custody. 15 5 The ABA Model Act would require stepparents
to assume a duty of support during the duration of the remarriage if
the child is not adequately supported by the custodial and non-custodial parent. The issue is left to the discretion of the family court. 1"s
The Model Act sets no standard for the court and does not even hint
at whether the stepparent would need to have a close relationship
with a stepchild before a support duty is imposed. Further, the Act
does not describe what the rule should be if the stepparent and the
custodial parent divorce.' 5 7 In the area of child support, then, the
ABA Model Act is incomplete.
The proposed statute is rather more complete in its discussion of
stepparent visitation rights following divorce. It takes a two-tiered
approach, first asking if the stepparent has standing to seek visitation
and then asking if the visitation would be in the best interests of the
child. ' The standing question is to be resolved with reference to five
factors, which essentially examine the role of the stepparent in the
child's life (almost an in loco parentis question), the financial support offered by the stepparent, and the detriment to the child from
denying visitation. This approach seems to mesh well with the social
155. ABA MODEL ACT, reprinted in 25 FAM. L.Q. 140 (1991). This is actually an early
draft of the Model Act. The most recent draft was prepared in August, 1991 (copy on file in
the offices of the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW). All references are to the most recent draft, hereinafter cited as "MODEL ACT." In the area of discipline, the council suggests that stepparents,
with the authorization of the custodial parent, have the same rights to discipline a child as the
custodial parent so long as such discipline is not prohibited by the dissolution decree between
the biological parents. MODEL ACT at 2.
156. Id. at 1 3.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4. An earlier draft of the MODEL ACT called for the standing question in
cases of divorce of the remarriage to be judged by a "clear and convincing evidence" standard.
The most recent draft (as of August 7, 1991) makes no mention of a standard for standing in
the divorce context. The best interests determination is to be judged by a preponderance of the
evidence standard in both drafts.
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science research on stepfamilies in that it recognizes the potentially
close and important relationships stepparents and stepchildren can
have.159 The court, if it finds standing, then completes the analysis
with the best interests standard of the jurisdiction.16 0 The Model
Act's section on custody also requires a two-tiered test, requiring
standing161 and increasing the burden on the stepparent in the best
interests analysis to a clear and convincing standard.
The most recent draft of the Model Act contemplates the possible end of the remarriage by either divorce or death of the custodial
parent.16 2 Its provisions for custody and visitation are essentially parallel in either event, although the provisions regarding death of the
biological parent set forth the standing standards more clearly. 6 '
The ABA Model Act is a worthwhile start, but it is little more
than that. Even the more complete drafts seem incomplete and offer
little guidance. Those sections that are specific, namely the visitation
and custody sections, seem to be in keeping with the social science
findings discussed elsewhere in this Article.
2. Redman Model.-R. Michael Redman, an Idaho magistrate judge, has made a noteworthy call for reform in the area of
child support. His proposal is at once simple and monumental:
My proposal is a simple one: when natural parents divorce, natural parents remain financially responsible for the children of
the union until such time as the parent with whom the children
primarily live marries again. At that point, the replacement parent becomes financially responsible for the children, unless and
until the natural parent with the children marries someone
else. 64
Redman's proposal has the advantage of providing bright line
rules for courts and eliminating role ambiguity (at least in this one
discreet area) for stepparents. However, it ignores the entire question
of whether the stepparent and the stepchild have any bond and
whether the stepparent should, therefore, have an expectation that
he will be obliged to support the child. There is a further disadvan159. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
160. MODEL ACT at 4.
161. Again, an earlier draft of the Act had a different proposal. The draft printed at 25
FAM. L. Q. 140 (1991) has a very sparse discussion of custody. The August, 1991, draft is
more complete.
162. MODEL ACT at
6 and 7.
163. Id.
164. Redman, The Support of Children in Blended Families: A Call for Change, 25
FAM. L.Q. 83, 89 (1991).
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tage in that non-custodial (biological) parents would have virtually
no incentive to support their children. Conversely, those considering
marriage to custodial parents might be discouraged by the per se
financial obligation.
3. Mahoney's Proposal.-Professor Margaret Mahoney has
proposed reforms in the areas of child support, visitation, custody,
and inheritance.' 68 In support cases, Mahoney calls for legislation
along the lines of the British Matrimonial Causes Act."'6 That Act
calls for courts to examine the length of the remarriage, the financial
arrangements of the parties during the marriage, the earning potentials of the custodial parent and the stepparent, and the needs of the
stepchild.16 7 Mahoney sees this approach as flexible and case-specific, incorporating a sort of estoppel, but without the limitations
currently imposed.16 8 Such an approach seems to have the advantages of recognizing that each family is different and that general
rules, such as Redman's, are often inappropriate.
Mahoney is less detailed in her suggestions for reforming visitation and custody laws."6 9 She argues for legislation defining the jurisdiction of courts to hear visitation and custody cases and, further, for
7
that legislation to set forth appropriate standards.1 1
In inheritance cases, Mahoney posits that steprelatives should
71
to take by intdstacy when certain conditions are met.
allowed
be
Mahoney would insist that a de facto family relationship (defined as
essentially an in loco parentis relationship) exist and that that relationship have begun during the stepchild's minority.' 72 Further, Mahoney's test would require that relationship to continue until the
time of the decedent's death. 73 Mahoney limits her broad extension
of rights by including only stepparents and stepchildren.' 7 '
165. See supra notes 12 and 55 and accompanying text.
166. Mahoney, supra note 12. The Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act
of 1960, 8&9 Eliz. 2, ch. 48 (1960), in concert with Snow v. Snow, 3 All. E.R. 833 (Div. Ct.),
appeal denied, 3 All E.R. 858 (C.A. 1971), goes a great deal further in imposing stepparent
support obligations than any U.S. jurisdiction. Commentators have argued, though, that it is
as insensitive to stepfamilies as the U.S. laws. Sarah H. Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren: A Comparative Analysis of Policies and Problems in the
American and English Experience, 36 SYRAcusE L. REV. 659 (1985).
167. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 60.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 79.
170. Id.
171. Mahoney, supra note 56, at 930.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 933.
174. Id. at 934.
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4. Wrongful Death and Medical Decisionmaking.-There has
been scant attention so far to the areas of wrongful death statutes
and steprelatives and medical decisionmaking. In the former case,
this is probably because there have been relatively few cases involving just such a circumstance. 175 In the latter case, it is likely that
few cases have arisen because medical decisionmaking statutes are of
such recent vintage and the stepfamily application simply has not yet
176
occurred.
C. Proposed Reforms
1. Support Obligations.-Both during remarriages and after
they end, we propose that support obligations be based on estoppel
theory.177 This approach avoids the limits of an in locci parentis approach because the obligation would not terminate at the end of the
remarriage. 178 Further, it meets expectations of both parties. Estoppel requires that the stepparent knowingly establish a situation in
which a stepchild could be expected to rely on the stepparent. 179
Thus, the stepchild would expect financial support and the stepparent could hardly be surprised at a support order.
The advantages of such a proposal are that it would lessen both
role ambiguity (stepparents who created dependence would know
they might be called on for support) and role conflict (biological parent, stepparent, and stepchild would all understand what was expected). It also provides a court with great flexibility, considerably
more than Redman's proposal. 180 The inherent flexibility recognizes
the social science findings that stepfamilies are not uniform and that
different age and gender combinations among stepparents and
stepchildren yield different relationships. 81 We would recommend a
clear and convincing standard of proof, given the possibly great lia1 82
bility such a determination would place on a stepparent.
175. A LEXIS search on November 20, 1992, revealed only 99 cases from the query
"(stepparent or stepchild or stepchildren or stepfather or stepmother or stepson or stepdaughter) w/ 15 "wrongful death". The vast majority of cases found were not on topic or were cases
in which recovery was denied. The search was conducted in the "States" library, "Omni" file.
176. Again, a LEXIS search on November 20, 1992, discovered no cases involving this
set of facts. The query was "(stepparent or stepchild or stepchildren or stepfather or stepmother or stepson or stepdaughter) w/1 5 ("living will" or "durable power" or "non-declarant"
or (medical w/5 decision!)". The search was conducted in the "States" library, "Omni" file.
177. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
182. See Table One. Our proposals include suggested "burdens of proof" or "burdens of
production." By this, we mean the quantum of proof required by the proponent of an issue in
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The desirability of using estoppel theory in such cases was recently recognized by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Ulrich v.
Cornell.18 3 In Ulrich, the facts were these: Catherine Cornell had a
son out of wedlock when she married John Ulrich in 1979. Catherine, with John's consent, sought a termination of the parental rights
of the son's biological father. John signed a paper indicating his intent to adopt the boy, but financial constraints prevented completion
of the adoption. Nonetheless, John treated the boy as his son, introduced him as his son, and promised repeatedly to support the child
financially until he was eighteen years old. When John and Catherine divorced, John denied any financial responsibility for the
child." "
The Court of Appeals noted that the mother testified that she
would never have sought termination of the biological father's rights
but for the promise John made to adopt and support the boy. 183 The
court then applied estoppel theory and held the stepfather liable for
the child's support because the mother had relied on his promise.1 86
The result in Ulrich was a proper one, and it was one tailored to the
specific situation.'8 7
2. Visitation.-Courts considering visitation between stepparents and stepchildren should apply an in loco parentis analysis. If
the stepparent has effectively been a parent, the social science findings cited herein would dictate that continuing that relationship
order to make a case. Of course, the proponent will differ with the issue: in a support case, the
proponent may be a custodial parent acting on behalf of a child; in a visitation case, the
proponent may be a stepparent. Because burdens of proof are, by nature, imprecisely defined,
we believe we should make clear our working definitions. "Clear and convincing evidence"
means that amount of proof that would leave little doubt in the mind of the trier of fact. It is
the most stringent level of proof we consider. "Preponderance of the evidence" means that
there is more evidence in favor of the proposition than against it.
183. In re Marriage of Ulrich v. Cornell, 469 N.W.2d 890 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd
484 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1992) (court agreed equitable estoppel is valid in the support situation,
but not on the facts of this case).
184. Id. at 891.
185. Id. at 892.
186. Id. at 895. The Ulrich opinion points out one of the anomalies of estoppel arguments in the stepfamily context. Generally, child support actions are considered actions by the
child. In Ulrich, as in many support cases, the reliance was the mother's. This makes little
practical difference, given that the finances of custodial parent and child are usually pooled.
187. Of note is the dissent of Judge Ralph Adam Fine, who argued that, in Wisconsin,
family law is statutory. He wrote that the Wisconsin support statute names only "parents" as
being liable. "The majority's use of estoppel to create such an obligation where, as here, that is
specifically prohibited by statute usurps the legislative function." 469 N.W.2d at 897 (Fine, J.,
dissenting). Judge Fine makes a good argument for legislative reform. If that were to happen,
courts like the Ulrich court would not have to resort to applying common law in derogation of
statutes.

STEPFAMILY LAW

could be worthwhile to the child.18 8 Courts should look to the nature
of the relationships between stepparents and stepchildren; those that
are enduring and nurturing should be continued, with the stepparent
having the same a priori visitation rights as a natural parent.
Courts reviewing visitation requests should apply a preponderance of the evidence standard. We recommend a relatively low
threshold because we believe it is a simpler matter for a court to
determine that there is an in loco parentis relationship than for it to
determine that there should be estoppel (as in the support discussion
above). 89 A good example of the proper application of this idea is
the Nebraska Supreme Court's analysis in Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom. 9 ' In that case, the stepfather lived with his stepdaughter
from the time she was two years old until his divorce from the girl's
mother several years later. During those years, the stepfather supported the girl financially, disciplined her when necessary, "helped
take care of her, cooked her meals, put her to bed, and attended her
school plays and parent-teacher conferences."''
The girl never referred to him as her stepfather, calling him instead "Daddy." The
girl has his surname and the two had a "mutual loving relationship."' 92 The mother never denied the relationship, but tried to per93
suade the court not to allow visitation because "it's not his child."'
The Nebraska court saw that there was an enduring and nurturing relationship and upheld the order for visitation based on an in
loco parentis analysis. 9 4 This approach seems proper when considering the best interests of the child and the former stepparent.
3. Custody.-Custody determinations present a more difficult
issue. We believe there is insufficient social science research at present to justify any approach that would regularly allow stepparents
to take custody rather than biological parents. There are clearly
cases in which it would be appropriate (an unfit custodial parent or
the death of the custodial parent with no fit non-custodial parent).
As noted, few states currently depart from a strong preference for
biological parents. 93 Hawaii's approach, allowing custody to third
188. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
189. We say this because, in the in loco parentis context, both stepparent and child
would have incentive to testify truthfully. In the estoppel situation, the stepparent might be
less than candid and the child might be under pressure to claim an expectation he never had.
190. 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1991).
191. Id. at 11.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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parties when it is in the best interests of the child, seems to take a
leap of reason that we are unwilling to follow.' 9 6 California's tiered
approach seems the best among current legislation: to the biological
parents jointly or to either and then to a person in whose home the
197
child has had a stable environment.
In that vein, we would tentatively suggest that there be a preference for fit biological parents with a careful eye toward the best interests of the child. Any finding in favor of custody awards to stepparents should be supported by clear and convincing evidence. A
recent case in Nebraska provides a good example of how this proposal might work in practice. In Stuhr v. Stuhr,9 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court examined a case in which the original custody agreement granted custody to the stepfather and the mother later
petitioned for modification. The trial court refused the request, but
the Supreme Court reversed, citing the mother's fitness and the
strong biological preference in custody matters. The court stated:
"[T]he courts may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of a
minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit
to perform the duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited
that right."' 9 9 The court determined that the mother, who at the
time of the divorce had both drug and alcohol dependencies, had
successfully sought treatment and could now provide a stable, wholesome home for her child. 20 ' Thus assured, the court held in favor of
biology and granted the mother custody. 20 1 This seems a reasonable
result. There is, of course, the contrary argument that repeated
changes of custody were probably not beneficial to the child, espe20 2
cially when the stepparent was fit.
4. Inheritance/lIntestacy.-Intestacystatutes are meant to reflect the will of the average decedent. 20 3 Yet, as noted, they almost
universally now exclude stepchildren and parents. 0 4 We believe Mahoney's suggestion2 0 5 is appropriate. It would allow a steprelative to
take by intestacy when there is a de facto family relationship that
was formed during the stepchild's minority. We accept the restric196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
481 N.W.2d 212 (Neb. 1992).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
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tion to those relationships formed during minority because it avoids
questions of whether stepchildren might, in later years, effect close
relationships in order for pecuniary gain.
Defining de facto family relationships is a difficult task. We
would suggest an approach that parallels in loco parentis analysis. It
stands to reason that a stepparent who sought to become, in effect, a
parent to the child would want the child to take from his estate. It is
also true, of course, that stepparents who wish to exclude stepchildren could do so readily by drafting wills. It is because of the ease of
negating the statutory presumption that we believe courts should apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to this issue.
There is, then, the question of unclear class gifts in wills. 20 6 We
believe that stepchildren should continue to bear the burden of proving they were intended for inclusion. However, we opt for a lower
standard of proof than is currently required, given that stepchildren
currently almost never prevail. 21 7 Our proposal calls for a preponderance of the evidence standard in such determinations.
5. Wrongful Death.-There are circumstances when it would
be appropriate to allow steprelatives to sue third parties for wrongful
death, and the current virtual per se rule is inappropriate. Legislatures considering their wrongful death statutes should ask the question posed by Washington Supreme Court Justice James M. Dolliver
in his dissent in Klossner v. San Juan County:2 18 "What is the purpose of wrongful death statutes? 20 9 The purpose must be to provide
relief to those who reasonably relied upon a person killed through
the wrongful act of a third party. This suggests that it would be
reasonable to include steprelatives when they have such reasonable
reliance.21 0
To that end, we propose that the same analysis apply in wrongful death cases as in estoppel cases (although this is not actually
estoppel), namely, that where a person has justifiably relied on a
steprelative wrongfully killed, a court should entertain the action.2 11
206. Supra notes 66, 67 and accompanying text.
207. In re Estate of Claffey, 257 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), asked the correct
question (namely, was there a relationship that resembled that of a biological parent and
child) but set too high a standard.
208. Klossner v. San Juan County, 605 P.2d 330 (Wash. 1980).
209. Id. at 341 (Dolliver, J.,dissenting).
210.. The Washington statute now allows courts to entertain wrongful death actions by
those "who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support." WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.020 (1986 and Supp. 1992).
211. The situation would typically be a stepchild suing after the death of a stepparent.
However, one can imagine the scenario in which a stepchild was the major source of financial
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As with child support obligations, we recognize that the possible liability to third parties would rise dramatically, and we therefore call
for a clear and convincing evidence standard.
6. Medical Decisionmaking.-We preface our recommendations in this area by recognizing that it is an emerging area of the
law and that there are a great many issues remaining to be clarified.
That said, we believe that legislatures might benefit from suggestions
based on careful research.
The parallels between living wills and testamentary wills and
2 12
between non-declarant statutes and intestacy statutes are clear.
We would, then, apply the same standard to non-declarant cases as
to intestacy: was there a de facto family relationship?2 1 It is likely
that people in such relationships would want their steprelatives to
take part in decisions. Arkansas' statute, like some others, recognizes
that in some contexts by allowing someone Who stood in loco parentis to the patient to be the decisionmaker. 2 "
We depart from our intestacy analysis in setting the burden of
proof. In intestacy cases, the issue is money or property; in medical
decisionmaking, it is life. We therefore believe a higher standard of
proof is necessary. We suggest a clear and convincing evidence standard. In living will cases, we likewise would adopt the higher standard, given the relatively weightier issues. In all other respects, however, we would opt for an analysis paralleling that in our
testamentary will class gift analysis.
ISSUE
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V.

Conclusion
Both law and the social sciences have grappled with stepfamilies

support for an elderly stepparent.
212. Supra note 89 and accompanying text.
213. Supra notes 171-74, 206 and accompanying text.
214. Supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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and their relationships. However, setting the approaches of the two
fields side-by-side reveals wide disparity. We contend that
lawmakers have operated in a vacuum of legal assumptions (as they
often do in family law) and would do well to probe the social science
findings regarding stepfamilies to better tailor the law to the expectations and realities of stepfamilies. This would be in the best interests of stepfamily members and, given the growing number of
stepfamilies in the United States, in the best interests of the society
generally.
In so advocating, we recognize the controversy about applying
social science findings to law. As we have argued, however, the findings upon which our recommendations are based are the results of
careful and systematic research. While no study of people can be
absolutely accurate in all cases (a point our flexible approach recognizes), careful study is certainly a better base for lawmaking than
the conjecture that has been the norm.
There is a need for change. Current legal structures are not
serving stepfamilies well; the problems are legion and will probably
multiply. Legislatures and courts must take stock of the current
knowledge about stepfamilies and make those reforms. Perhaps, if
they do, Cinderella's long wait to have her status clarified and sensitively treated will at long last end.

